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FOLLOW THE LEADER:  ELIMINATING PERVERSE 
GLOBAL FISHING SUBSIDIES THROUGH 
UNILATERAL DOMESTIC TRADE MEASURES 
Anastasia Telesetsky* 
ABSTRACT 
Perverse subsidies including fuel tax rebates lead to overfishing through a 
combination of overcapacity and excess fishing effort.  The current overfishing 
trend has depleted certain key commercial fisheries with implications for future 
food security, particularly in regions dependent on fish protein.  Over the course of 
the past four decades, there have been a number of multilateral efforts to eliminate 
these subsidies including environmental treaties, environmental targets, and trade 
negotiations.  None of these attempts at a global cooperative response have 
achieved a reduction in perverse subsidies.  This Essay proposes the adoption of 
unilateral trade measures or a set of “Friends of the Fish” trade measures to 
eliminate perverse subsidies.  As explained in the Essay, parties that might oppose 
these trade measures would be unlikely to prevail in a dispute settlement based on 
previous decisions from the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body 
involving conservation of natural resources.  Further, although unilateralism may 
not be optimal, it may be sufficient to create changes in subsidization practices as 
states who continue to subsidize fishing fleets lose access to important trading 
markets.   
INTRODUCTION 
A large proportion of the global population lives near the coast.  As a result, 
the oceans are the world’s largest source of protein, with more than 2.6 billion 
people depending on the oceans as their primary source of protein.1  In addition to 
food benefits, marine fisheries and related industries are estimated to generate $3 
trillion in revenue per year or about 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP).2  
But these benefits for nutrition and job security come with financial costs that can 
lead to long-term environmental damage as long as governments continue to 
underwrite unsustainable fishing through perverse subsidies.  
In spite of the rhetoric of fishing as a sustainable enterprise, the reality is that 
marine catches that would otherwise be worth $105 billion are now being sold for 
$80 billion with the difference being covered by taxpayers around the world in the 
form of various subsidies.3  The $3 trillion industry of fishing depends on “perverse 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor, University of Idaho, College of Law. 
 1. Rio+20 Feature: Seven Issues, Seven Experts - Oceans, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42221&Cr=Sustainable+Development&Cr1=#.UINGi
XFbyJU. 
 2. Id. 
 3. NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES:  HOW TAX DOLLARS CAN 
UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 190 (2001).  
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subsidies”4 from the government, such as the fuel subsidies that allow vessels to 
travel further than the market price of fish would otherwise support, and the distant 
water fishing/economic development subsidies that allow fleets from Asia and 
Europe to regularly exploit African waters.   
 “Perverse subsidies” are, however, a two-edged sword, or perhaps a double-
barbed fishing hook.  On the one barb, subsidies ensure profit for a struggling 
industry where margins may be slim given the incessant competition from fishing 
operations peppered across the globe.  On the same barb, subsidies also protect 
consumer access to cheap fish for sushi rolls and salmon bakes.  Without some 
subsidies, prices would need to be increased to cover costs to the dismay of 
consumers and to the alarm of fishing companies which would lose sales.  
Meanwhile, on the other barb of the two-barbed hook, there are legitimate concerns 
about how certain common subsidies are impacting global food security policies.  
Almost any subsidy that encourages fishermen to fish during the present season in 
a depleted fishery rather than wait for the stock to rebuild to healthier levels for a 
future fishing season is a “perverse subsidy.”  Cheaper technological advancements 
in finding and extracting fish have created conditions where overfishing has 
become a global norm rather than an exception.  Now, fewer and fewer individuals 
are able to operate large vessels with lengthy nets leading to fewer opportunities for 
fishing.  High seas fishing and fishing at the boundaries between the high seas and 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in particular, are now in the realm of 
multinational factory fishing corporations instead of artisanal fishermen or small 
fishing cooperatives.   
Like other essays in the field of fisheries and trade, this Essay argues that 
perverse subsidies must be eliminated, but unlike previous writings in this field, 
this Essay provides a different line of argument suggesting that unilateral actions to 
end subsidies in the sphere of fishery trading may be more effective than the 
currently stalled Doha deliberations on fishery reforms.  In Part I, this Essay 
reviews the long-term consequences of perverse subsidies on fishery resources.  In 
Part II, this Essay explains why multilateral environmental approaches have no 
potential of tackling perverse subsidies and why current multilateral trade 
negotiations are unlikely to result in an elimination of perverse subsidies.  Finally, 
in Part III, this Essay argues that the parties that have been seeking reforms of 
perverse subsidies, including the elimination of these subsidies before the WTO, 
should instead apply their efforts to unilaterally restricting trade in fishery products 
from states that continue to provide perverse subsidies that impact both economic 
competition for limited resources and continued viability of some of these 
resources.  This third part also argues that exceptions under Article XX of the 
General Agreement for Trade and Tariffs (GATT) will protect states undertaking 
unilateral trade measures that are intended to further resource conservation.   
                                                                                                     
 4. Perverse subsidies refer to any government support provided to an economic actor to encourage 
certain activities that directly or indirectly lead to environmental degradation.  It is not the intention of 
this Essay to argue that subsidies are inherently poor policy choices.  There are, in fact, a number of 
subsidies that can promote environmentally friendly technology.  These subsidies are not the focus of 
this Essay.  
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I.  DANGER OF CONTINUING PERVERSE SUBSIDIES FOR FOOD SECURITY 
When Wilbert Mcleod Chapman introduced the concept of “maximum 
sustainable yield” in the late 1940s,5 there did not seem to be a problem with the 
cumulative impact of overharvesting because fish were regarded as infinitely 
renewable and the fishing community was regarded as responsive to declines in key 
fisheries.  In a rational market, once fishing for particular species becomes 
unprofitable because the maximum sustainable yield of a given fish is low, then 
fishing should stop and the species should be able to recover while the fishing 
industry focuses on other species.  When the final negotiations of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concluded in 1982, the states decided to 
maintain the extraction standard of “maximum sustainable yield” to be qualified by 
conservation and management measures that support “populations of harvested 
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors.”6  The proponents of “maximum 
sustainable yield” as the foundation for global fishery management never took into 
account the possibility of government subsidies to the fishing industry funding 
what would otherwise be unprofitable fishing.  In fact, the Law of the Sea 
Convention never directly mentioned subsidies. 
It is not surprising that the Law of the Sea failed to even mention the existence 
of subsidies as a potential threat to the conservation of living resources.  The levels 
of overexploitation of ocean resources were not yet fully contemplated.  When the 
Law of the Sea was negotiated, the focus was on promoting fishery products as an 
approach for economic development so that states that were unable to fully utilize 
living resources within their exclusive economic zones could provide opportunities 
for other states to fish the “surplus of the allowable catch.”7  The idea was to 
promote both “equitable and efficient” utilization of the ocean’s resources.8  State 
decisionmakers failed to understand just how efficient a growing pool of subsidized 
industrial trawlers (who do not have to directly pay for externalities) can be in 
extracting fish biomass.  
The first large set of subsidies in the twentieth century was focused on creating 
the conditions for national food security.  Before and after World War II, states 
raced to secure limited sources of food for growing populations, and did so by 
encouraging domestic industries to ramp up production, not just for fish, but also 
for fishery related products.  For example, in 1936, the U.S. Jones Act offered 
indirect subsidies to the U.S. shipbuilding industry by requiring all ships expected 
to be used to land fish in the U.S. be manufactured in the U.S.9  Because this led to 
an increase in the costs for fishing companies participating in the U.S. market, the 
                                                                                                     
 5. CARMEL FINLEY, ALL THE FISH IN THE SEA: MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE YIELD AND THE FAILURE 
OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 4 (2011).  Mr. Chapman, after his military service during World War II in 
the Pacific theater, was focused on expanding American fishing efforts into the Pacific ocean in order to 
compete with Japanese fishing efforts and strengthen American military presence.  Id.  
 6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 61, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 7. Id. art. 62.  
 8. Id.  
 9. WILLIAM E. SCHRANK, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTRODUCING 
FISHING SUBSIDIES 16 (2003).  
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U.S. offered to cover some new debt through the Fisheries Finance Program for 
U.S. vessel construction.  In response to these programs initiated in the 1960s, the 
U.S. fishing industry expanded. 10 
Fishing fleets are now ultra-efficient in their fishing extraction with large 
storage hulls, immense nets, and technological support from satellites and sonars 
for locating fish schools.  A number of perverse subsidies contribute to this 
“efficiency.”  There has been broad recognition that governments need to remove 
environmentally harmful subsidies, especially in the area of fisheries.11  
Overexploitation of fishing resources around the world includes the following yield 
losses:  North America (23%), Europe (19%), Africa (19%), Asia (14%), Oceania 
(13%), High Seas (11%), and South America (7%).12 
It has not been easy for researchers and policymakers to determine which 
direct and indirect subsidies are supporting an industry because governments are 
not forthcoming with the necessary information.13  Based on modeling, researchers 
have calculated around $15 billion of non-fuel “bad subsidies” including subsidies 
for boat construction and modernization, fishing port construction, 
marketing/processing and storage infrastructure, tax exemptions, fishing access 
agreements, and fishery development projects.14  All of these are considered “bad 
subsidies” because they increase fleet capacity and fleet fishing effort in a time 
when most commercial fishing stocks are already overexploited.  One of the most 
pervasive set of perverse subsidies offered are fuel subsidies where fishermen pay 
less for fuel than other industries or individuals.  Estimated to range between $4.2 
billion to $8.5 billion annually,15 these subsidies are offered by governments 
through lower costs of fuel at port facilities, tax rebates on fuel, or other kickback 
mechanisms.  From the perspective of the fishing industry, these subsidies are 
essential because almost all of the major fishing states provide some sort of fuel 
subsidy, since fuel can amount to up to 60% of the fishing costs for certain 
fisheries, such as Hong Kong,16 and for most other fisheries it accounts for 10% to 
25% of the fishing costs.17  The largest fuel subsidies provided for high seas fishing 
                                                                                                     
 10. Id.  
 11. See generally Patrick ten Brink, Reforming Subsidies, in THE ECONOMICS AND ECOSYSTEMS 
AND BIODIVERSITY IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKING 259, 259-97 (Patrick ten Brink 
ed., 2011). 
 12. U. Thara Srinivasan et al., Food Security Implications of Global Marine Catch Losses Due to 
Overfishing, 12 J. OF BIOECONOMICS 183, 194 (2010), available at 
http://www.ecomarres.com/downloads/Thara2.pdf. 
 13. See generally CATCHING MORE BAIT:  A BOTTOM UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL FISHERIES 
SUBSIDIES (Ussif Rashid Sumaila & Daniel Pauly eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing data collection 
methodology). 
 14. Id. at 23. 
 15. Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al.,  Fuel Price Increase Subsidies, Overcapacity, and Resource 
Sustainability, 65 J. OF MARINE SCIENCE 832, 835 (2008), available at 
http://www.icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/6/832.full.pdf.  
 16. Sarah Harper et al., Fueling the Fisheries Subsidy Debate: Agreements, Loopholes, and 
Implications, 113 FISHERIES RESEARCH 143, 143 (2012).  
 17. Rolf Willman & Kieran Kelleher, Economic Trends in Global Marine Fisheries, in HANDBOOK 
OF MARINE FISHERIES CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 26 (R. Quentin Grafton et al. eds., 2010).  
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activity are offered by Japan, South Korea, Russia, and Spain,18 which respectively 
provide somewhere around twenty-five cents, eighteen cents, eighteen cents, and 
ten cents per liter for a subsidy.19  Estimated across 144 coastal states, these fuel 
subsidies account for 25% of total fishery subsidies and 65% of the subset of 
subsidies that have been defined as perverse subsidies (e.g., encouraging excess 
fishing effort and overcapitalization particularly for industrial fishing fleets). 20  
Subsidized fuel is one of the key drivers for excess fishing effort since each ton of 
fish landed requires about half a ton of fuel to capture the fish.21  
As a result of such perverse incentives, the fishing industry has become 
overcapitalized, with too many boats catching too few fish.  This has resulted in 
market losses.  According to the World Bank and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the combination of competition between industrial fishing fleets 
relying on perverse subsidies, poor regulation, and no enforcement has led to losses 
of $50 billion in potential revenue in marine fisheries.22  Although subsidies are not 
the only problem for healthy fishery management, they are a substantial contributor 
to oversupply of boats in already overexploited fisheries.  A number of countries 
are unapologetic about their use of subsidies, including perverse incentives in order 
to maintain an industry.  For example, in China, the second largest global 
subsidizer of its fishing industry,23 Chinese economists have observed that 
subsidies necessary for the China National Fisheries Corporation (China’s state-
owned fishing industry) to operate were almost half of the company’s net profit in 
2008.24   
Perverse subsidies have created a problem with socio-ecological feedback 
loops.  There is an assumption that markets operate as balanced feedback loops 
where prices are set depending on the shifting balance between supply and demand.  
These prices should signal something to buyers about the health of specific 
                                                                                                     
 18. Nic Fleming, Scientists Call for Fuel Subsidies Ban to Protect Fish, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 19, 
2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1543142/Scientists-
call-for-fuel-subsidies-ban-to-protect-fish.html. 
 19. Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al., Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries: Magnitude and Impacts on 
Resource Sustainability, in CATCHING MORE BAIT: A BOTTOM UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 38, 38-42 (2nd ed. 2006) (stating that the single largest fuel subsidy described in 
this report was 40 cents per liter for Hong Kong). See also Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al., Subsidies to 
High Seas Bottom Trawl Fleets and the Sustainability of Deep Sea Benthic Fish Stocks, in CATCHING 
MORE BAIT: A BOTTOM UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 49, 49-53 (2nd ed. 2006) 
(identifying Japan, South Korea, and Russia’s subsidies to bottom trawlers which consume a large 
amount of fuel as respectively $290 million, $146 million, and $163 million). 
 20. Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al., Fuel Subsidies to Global Fisheries:  Magnitude and Impacts on 
Resource Sustainability, in CATCHING MORE BAIT:  A BOTTOM UP RE-ESTIMATION OF GLOBAL 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 47 (2nd ed. 2006).  
 21. Willman & Kelleher, supra note 17, at 28 (observing that a ton of fish worth $918 requires $282 
of fuel). 
 22. WORLD BANK & FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE SUNKEN BILLIONS:  THE ECONOMIC 
JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHERIES REFORM 41 (2009), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-
1224775570533/SunkenBillionsFinal.pdf  
 23. Tabitha Grace Mallory, China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry:  Evolving Policies and 
Implications, 38 MARINE POLICY 99, 103 (2012) (20% of the subsidies offered are considered perverse 
subsidies). 
 24. Id.  
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resources such as a commercial fishery.  Yet markets where subsidies have been 
introduced are unable to provide appropriate feedback about the ecological 
condition of a given resource until it is too late.  Perverse subsidies delay the 
provision of necessary information about the state of marine resources to decision-
makers.  Since perverse subsidies externalize certain essential costs, making the 
cost of production less expensive, the producers see this coverage from society as a 
signal to do more of whatever activity is provided for by the subsidy.  Fuel 
subsidies encourage more fuel usage.  Ship building subsidies encourage more 
shipbuilding.  Subsidized port infrastructure encourages expansion of fleets to use 
the new ports.  All of these subsidies focus on growing an already bloated industry 
and threaten to bring an end to commercial fishing. 
Consumers remain inured to the vicious cycle of perverse subsidization.  They 
may justifiably believe that the low cost of fish is not a result of over-exploitation 
financed by subsidies, but rather, a result of an overabundance of a resource.  
Cheap prices for consumers mean that the demand continues for large quantities of 
fish.  Raising the market price of fish to reflect the realities of what it actually costs 
to obtain the fish is an unattractive option for private fishermen as long as 
governments continue to pay subsidies.  As long as certain types of subsidies, such 
as fuel subsidies for large highly profitable fishing fleets, continue to be treated as 
industry entitlements, there will continue to be recurring threats to long-term food 
security. 
A study by Ransom Myers and Boris Worm concluded in 2003 that when 
industrialized fishing begins in a marine community, the amount of biomass may 
be reduced by 80%.25  This number is particularly concerning from a food security 
perspective since much of the reduction in biomass has either been discarded as 
bycatch or used for products other than traditional fish and seafood markets.  
Indeed, a substantial amount of what is being harvested from the seas is not being 
used for basic human nutrition.  The state of the modern marine fisheries today 
parallels in many respects the United States Plains where basic food crops such as 
corn26 are being harvested, not as food, but as the building blocks for chemicals or 
as stock for biofuel production.  Instead of harvesting corn, marine industrial 
trawlers are harvesting menhaden, a member of the herring family, for omega-3 
fish oil as a nutritional supplement, chicken feed, pet food ingredient, lipstick base, 
paint additive, and salad dressing ingredient.27   
The fuel subsidies that contribute to making the harvest of large quantities of 
menhaden and other fish so profitable are potentially undercutting long-term food 
security.  By creating conditions for the industrial harvest of fish in part through 
subsidies for a number of extraneous products that provide, at best, indirect 
nutrition for humans (e.g., chicken and livestock feed), we may be jeopardizing the 
                                                                                                     
 25. Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities, 
423 NATURE 207, 280 (2003), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v423/n6937/pdf/nature01610.pdf.  
 26. As the documentary KING CORN demonstrates, corn crops grown for chemical production are 
not even edible if there is a need to harvest the crops for food.  See KING CORN (Mosaic Films 2007). 
 27. H. BRUCE FRANKLIN, THE MOST IMPORTANT FISH IN THE SEA 115-16 (2008); Paul Greenberg, 
Op-Ed., A Fish Oil Story, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/opinion/16greenberg.html. 
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future viability of much bigger food fisheries.  Menhaden are an important part of 
the marine food chain28 and without sufficient menhaden, other fish species will 
collapse, including tuna and striped bass. 
While states are limited to available technical options for resuscitating dying 
fisheries, the cessation of perverse subsidies is a recurring available option.  The 
question is: what approach is most effective?  It is clear that perverse subsidies 
such as fuel subsidies offered by one country have competitive trade implications 
for other states.  Presumably, the more money that a country puts into fuel 
subsidies, the more fishing vessels it can partially finance or the further afield its 
flagged vessels can travel in search of fish and the more fish these vessels can 
capture. 
Once the subsidies have been introduced, they are very difficult to retract.  In 
some instances, distant water fishing fleet subsidies result in competitive 
advantages over the local fishing fleets.29  Vessels from China, Taiwan, and Korea 
might be more reluctant to fish off the coast of Africa if the capital and operating 
costs involved were not partially underwritten by their respective governments.  It 
is the state subsidies that make fishing in foreign waters so attractive.  While China 
may be improving its own food security by shipping some of the catch back to 
China and selling other fish into foreign markets as an economic trade strategy, it 
may also be jeopardizing the ability of other states to meet their food security 
goals.30  Politically, it becomes quite difficult for national or provincial leaders to 
retract what has become deemed an entitlement for the industry.31  The following 
sections examine how multilateral solutions are unlikely to eliminate, in a timely 
fashion, existing perverse subsidies that are leading to excess fishing capacity and 
impacting long-term global food security.  
II.  THE WISHFUL AND MAGICAL THINKING  
OF MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS TO ELIMINATE PERVERSE SUBSIDES 
Multilateral cooperation has become the platinum standard of international 
policy in fisheries.  This tendency to seek multistate participation is rational 
because many fish are migratory or straddling stocks, and collectively, we still 
know remarkably little about the interaction among various fish stocks spanning 
politically designated boundaries.  In a world of political leaders who prioritize 
long-term conservation matters over other matters, such as immediate economic 
                                                                                                     
 28. FRANKLIN, supra note 27, at 42. 
 29. Edward N. Kimani et al., Fisheries in the Southwest Indian Ocean:  Trends and Governance 
Challenges, in THE INDIAN OCEAN:  RESOURCE AND GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 3, 11 (Ellen Laipson 
& Amit Pandya eds., 2009). 
 30. See generally U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food:  Fisheries and the Right to Food: 
Report by Olivier de Schutter (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/executivesummary_october2012_ii_en_1.pdf. 
 31. ORG. OF ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL SUBSIDIES:  
CHALLENGES FOR REFORM 62 (2005), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-
food/environmentally-harmful-subsidies_9789264012059-en (“It is well recognized that subsidies 
become capitali[z]ed into the prices of factors of production . . . .  The expectation that subsidy 
programmes will continue also tend to become embedded in the expectations of producers and 
consumers.”). 
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benefits to existing voters, multilateralism should be the sine qua non of fishery 
decision-making.  Unfortunately, as described below, multilateralism has failed to 
deliver conservation benefits in a timely fashion such that fishery stocks continue 
to collapse in spite of greater international awareness.  A multilateral 
environmental solution to the continued assignation of perverse subsidies is a 
matter of wishful thinking.  As many of the collapsing fish stocks are target species 
for trade, the trade regime seems better equipped to create binding rules for 
eliminating perverse subsidies.  Yet, the trade regime has become locked into 
inertia as some key fish trading WTO parties push for reform while other key fish 
trading parties resist reform.  As the Doha Round fails to create consensus and 
parties continue to assign subsidies to their fleets, a multilateral trade solution 
seems to become a product of magical thinking.   
A.  Wishful Thinking:  Limitation of Environmental Multilateralism  
in Fisheries Conservation  
Most existing fisheries’ conservation efforts have been the result of 
multilateralism through either international treaties or regional agreements.  This 
section will discuss a number of efforts that have the untapped potential to address 
perverse subsidies, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Fish Stocks Agreements, Food and 
Agriculture Organization soft law, the Port State Agreement, and the Aichi Targets 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity.   
In 1973, states negotiated the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora32 (CITES) in order to limit the trade 
in overexploited species.  While the treaty protects primarily land-based animals 
and birds, there are also a few marine fish, mollusk, turtle, and shark species listed 
for either total protection or controlled trade that might otherwise be in the food 
trade.  For example, Appendix I provides for full protection of marine turtles and 
marine mussels and Appendix II provides for controlled trade in a number of shark 
species.   
CITES also includes an Appendix III where states can identify species that are 
subject to regulation within their own state in order to solicit cooperation from 
other parties in controlling trade of these species.  Surprisingly, there are no 
commercial marine fish species listed in Appendix III of the treaty.  This is a 
missed opportunity for states that might otherwise be used to control trade, 
particularly for species that certain countries have domestically deemed threatened.  
In some ways, this was a lost opportunity in 2010 when countries such as Monaco, 
supported by the U.S., called for the Atlantic bluefin tuna to be listed as an 
Appendix I species.33  After the twenty countries supporting this listing failed to 
gain support for this proposal,34 each of these countries could have applied for an 
                                                                                                     
 32. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 
1973, 14537 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter CITES]. 
 33. United States Supports Bluefin Tuna Trade Ban, ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Mar. 4, 2010), 
.http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2010/2010-03-04-02.html. 
 34. David Jolly & John M. Broder, U.N. Rejects Export Ban on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/science/earth/19species.html?_r=0 (observing 
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Appendix III listing.  While an Appendix III listing does not have the same 
implications as an Appendix I or II listing in terms of triggering a prohibition on 
trade or an export permit,35 it signals to other countries a clear conservation 
objective regarding a particular species.   
Instead of agreeing upon listings that would trigger affirmative action on the 
part of a Management Authority and Scientific Authority under the treaty,36 the 
parties instead agreed to vague unenforceable cooperative goals.  The 2002 attempt 
by Australia to have the Patagonian toothfish listed as an Appendix II species 
subject to additional trade controls failed to gain support.37  Instead, the parties 
agreed to a non-binding resolution to respond to the crisis over illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing of Patagonian toothfish in the Antarctic waters.  
Ultimately, the CITES parties called for better cooperation with the Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the 
Regional Fisheries Management Organization with some jurisdiction over the 
toothfish fishing area.38  Regarding trade of toothfish products, the parties 
“recommend[ed]” requiring the production of catch documentation requirements 
used by CCAMLR and introducing verification requirements.39  Ultimately, the 
toothfish trade remained outside of the binding purview of the CITES treaty.  
Even if the Monaco/U.S. proposal for listing of the Atlantic bluefin tuna and 
the Australia proposal for listing of the Patagonian toothfish had prevailed, leading 
to the first commercial fish listings, parties to CITES still would have the power to 
enter into reservations to listings under Appendix I and II.  What this means in 
practice is that a potentially large number of parties to CITES can become treaty 
non-parties for those species for which they have entered a reservation, without 
needing to provide any justification for the reservations.40  The possibility of 
entering species by species reservations has the potential to undermine the 
effectiveness of the treaty as a tool to globally regulate trade in species for which 
there are serious scientific concerns about the existing conservation management.    
CITES could be used as a tool for conservation of commercial marine species, 
but has yet to be relied upon by any state as part of a conservation strategy based 
on regulated trade.  Assuming that proposals for listing of commercial stocks 
would be more likely under the controls of Appendix II than the moratorium of 
                                                                                                     
that a similar proposal for bluefin tuna protection had been proposed for CITES listing in 1992 by 
Sweden). 
 35. The import of an Appendix III species requires a certificate of origin.  An export permit is also 
required if a species has been listed as an Appendix III species by the exporting country.  While the 
requirement to provide permits and certificates would not limit the trade in species such as bluefin tuna, 
it would provide potential critical information about fishing activities in terms of where threatened fish 
are being captured.  
 36. CITES, supra note 32, at art. IX. 
 37.  Food and Agric. Org., Patagonian Toothfish, FAO CORP. DOCUMENT REPOSITORY, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5261E/y5261e09.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (Australia proposed 
the inclusion of both the Patagonian toothfish and the Antarctic toothfish Dissostichus mawsonii in 
Appendix II to CITES but withdrew the proposal during COP 12). 
 38. Cooperation Between CITES and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources Regarding Trade in Toothfish, CITES.ORG, http://www.cites.org/eng/res/12/12-04.php 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 39. Id.  
 40. CITES, supra note 32, at art. XXIII. 
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Appendix I, there is detailed language in Article IV regarding the certification of 
species that arrive in a country as a result of trade and an “introduction from the 
sea.”41  From a species protection perspective, Article IV provides that Scientific 
Authorities should only provide certification for trade of a species when they are 
satisfied “that the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of the species 
involved.”42  In spite of plummeting stocks,43 no commercial fisheries species have 
yet to be listed because many states involved in commercial fish trading fear that 
conservation measures will prove to be trade barriers for their products.  Because of 
the political inertia surrounding high-volume commercial species, states have never 
arrived at the more complicated issues of figuring out how to implement potential 
restrictive trade measures to protect threatened marine commercial species.44  
If CITES, as a first-generation environmental treaty,45 has proven to do little to 
benefit exploited marine species that support food security strategies in spite of its 
potential for focusing on reducing trade, subsequent generations of multilateral 
environmental treaties in effect have failed to provide any more effective 
mechanisms than CITES.  The 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement46 does not directly 
address trade or subsidies.  Members are simply expected to “take measures to 
prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity and to ensure that 
levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use 
of fishery resources.”47  Indirectly, the Fish Stocks Agreement does provide that 
parties to the Agreement can treat either non-members of a regional fisheries 
management organization or non-parties to the Fish Stocks Agreements differently, 
such that, fish caught by either non-members or non-parties who fail to apply 
adequate conservation and management measures can be refused in ports.48  There 
is no evidence that the Fish Stocks Agreement has been used to ban shipments of 
fish from countries supporting heavily subsidized fleets.   
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. at art. IV. See also id. at art. I(e) (defining “[i]ntroduction from the sea” as “transportation 
into a State of specimens of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the 
jurisdiction of any State”). 
 42. Id. at art. IV. 
 43. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 30 (2012), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e00.htm.  
 44. There are a number of technical challenges in enforcing trade restrictions related to marine 
species.  Unlike ivory tusks or tortoiseshells, many marine species are processed at sea before they enter 
the channels of trade.  As a result, they are difficult to recognize and inspectors have to rely heavily on 
labeling.  Investigating whether boxes have been properly labeled is also a trick proposition because fish 
products can easily spoil, and therefore, time is of the essence in any inspection if States want to avoid 
the liability associated with spoiled cargo.  Finally, even if boxes can be opened easily for visual 
inspection, this may not be sufficient for identifying because of the similarities between fish products.  
States might then need to rely on genetic testing which may be costly and would definitely require a 
certain level of technical sophistication that may be lacking in a number of global ports likely to be 
inspecting products.  
 45.  Mark A. Drumbl, Actors and Law-making in International Environmental Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 15 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010). 
 46. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks:  
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (1995).  
 47. Id. at art. 5 (1550). 
 48. Id. at art. 23 & 33. 
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The 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing49 (IUU fishing) encouraged states to 
exercise the opportunity to close ports to vessels that are suspected of being 
engaged in illegal fishing so that they cannot offload their fish.  Presently, the 
Agreement is not yet in force because there are only four members to this 
Agreement:50  Norway the European Union, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.51  For states 
that implement it, this Agreement has the potential to have substantial trade 
implications for particular fleets and possibly particular flag states. 
Unfortunately, the Agreement is limited to closing ports to vessels that are 
engaged in fishing activities that have been designated as illegal, unreported, or 
unregulated.52  Because of the restrictive definition of IUU fishing, there is no 
opportunity under the agreement to close fishing ports to legally subsidized vessels 
that may be engaged in fishing of already limited stocks, but not technically 
engaged in IUU fishing, that will in the short-term, lead to fisheries’ collapse.53 
In addition to multilateral treaty efforts to combat overfishing and species 
extinction through trade channels, there are also non-binding soft law efforts to 
reduce fishing capacity.  In 1998, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
prepared an International Plan of Action (IPOA) for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity to support the FAO’s efforts to create a code of conduct for responsible 
fisheries.  According to the Code, parties were expected to make sure that “excess 
fishing capacity is avoided and . . . [that] the economic conditions under which 
fishing industries operate promote responsible fisheries.”54  The voluntary IPOA 
specified that states with overcapacity should create national plans for managing 
fishing capacity, including an assessment of “all factors, including subsidies, 
contributing to overcapacity”55 and then work to “reduce and progressively 
eliminate all factors, including subsidies . . . which contribute, directly or indirectly 
to the build-up of excessive fishing capacity, thereby undermining the 
sustainability of marine living resources.”56 
In concept, the IPOA could serve as an important non-binding policy tool 
respecting the different development statuses of each state and the need for 
flexibility in addressing capacity problems.  It allows each state to independently 
assess its particular challenge with overcapacity and then tackle those issues.  
                                                                                                     
 49. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, FAO.ORG, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/1_037t-e.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at art. 1. 
 53. One of the few areas of agreement regarding the trade negotiations over subsidies among all 
states is that subsidies should not be provided to vessels that have been prosecuted for IUU fishing.  
Unfortunately, certain entities such as the European Union continue to provide subsidies in spite of 
vessels having an IUU record.  See generally Identified Infringements, FISHSUBSIDY.ORG, 
http://fishsubsidy.org/infringements/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 54. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHING 10 (1995), available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM.  
 55. International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, FAO CORP. DOCUMENT 
REPOSITORY, http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/X3170E/x3170e04.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
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Unfortunately, very few states have taken the opportunity to publicly share their 
national plans for managing fishing.  According to the FAO website, the only three 
submissions were from Indonesia (2008), Namibia (2007), and the U.S. (2004).57  
Even if all countries participated in publicizing their national plans, the national 
plans may have ultimately provided  little strategic direction in subsidy reform.  As 
discussed below in the section on multilateral trade interventions, certain countries 
such as Japan and Korea do not regard subsidies as particularly problematic, but 
focus attention almost exclusively on poor fishing management practices.  While 
subsidies are not the singular cause for unsustainable marine resource extractions, 
the language in the IPOA offers states an opportunity to discuss subsidies as just 
another factor in overcapacity and not as a priority subject for policymaking.58   
Reflecting on the multilateral environmental treaties that are currently in 
effect, or might go into effect, reveals a disconnect between the globalized trade in 
fish products and the crisis of overfishing fueled by subsidies.  None of the 
multilateral environmental treaties mandates an elimination of perverse subsidies.  
The Convention on Biological Diversity has been the most explicit with its Aichi 
Targets set to address the decline in biodiversity.59  Target 3 requires that  
[b]y 2020, at the latest, incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity are 
eliminated, phased out or reformed in order to minimize or avoid negative impacts, 
and positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are 
developed and applied, consistent and in harmony with the Convention and other 
relevant international obligations, taking into account national socioeconomic 
conditions.60  
Perverse subsidies were recognized as one of the underlying reasons for 
biodiversity decline.61  The Aichi Target is probably the clearest statement with a 
timeline demanding reform of perverse subsidies.  
It is unlikely, however, that a multilateral environmental treaty alone or soft 
law that is supported by a majority of states will be able to tackle the removal of 
subsidies.  There is simply too much political inertia for maintaining the current 
subsidy structures.  In giving a technical rationale for Target 3 of the Aichi Targets, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity Secretariat observes that “[c]urrent 
negotiations under the Doha Trade Round . . . have the potential to generate high 
synergies with this target, and are therefore a key vehicle for achieving [it].”62  Yet, 
as the following section will explain, multilateral solutions in the trade sector 
appear as unlikely as a multilateral intervention by environmental treaty makers to 
                                                                                                     
 57. National Plans of Action, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, 
FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-capacity/npoa/en (last accessed 
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 58. REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION (NPOA) FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
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 59. Aichi Biodiversity Targets, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. TARGET 3—Technical Rationale Extended, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/rationale/target-3/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).  
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end perverse subsidies in any timely fashion.  Yet time is of the essence in 
conserving remaining commercial fish stocks.  Multilateral trade solutions alone 
will not achieve the phasing out process of harmful subsidies because of a seeming 
lack of political will as developed economies continue to deny the biological 
limitations of global fisheries contained in their national policies.  Wishful (or 
perhaps “fish full”) thinking is powerful, but not effective policymaking.  
B.  Magical Thinking:  Reluctance to Conclude the Doha Round  
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
If relying on multilateralism through environmental negotiation represents 
wishful thinking, then the current approach of attempting to negotiate the removal 
of subsidies through trade multilateralism verges on magical thinking.  
Negotiations to remove subsidies that encourage overcapacity and excess fishing 
efforts have been ongoing for nearly twelve years with little to show in terms of 
final agreements.  
The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM) under the 
GATT requires that parties submit information to the WTO  about when they 
provide a subsidy to an industry in order to expose potential sources of trade 
distortion.63  States have been reluctant to submit this information to the WTO 
because of a perception of competitive disadvantage.  Parties to GATT disagree 
about what constitutes a subsidy in relation to the fishery industry, and whether 
certain “good subsidies,” such as supporting purchase of equipment that eliminates 
bycatch, should even be considered subsidies for the purpose of implementing the 
SCM agreement or whether the focus should be exclusively on prohibited subsidies 
and actionable subsidies.64  States have raised further questions about whether the 
category of prohibited subjects under the SCM agreement is too narrow since the 
only prohibited subsidies are those contingent on export performance or the use of 
domestic goods rather than imported goods.65  
In 2001, parties to the WTO negotiations on trade as a strategy for 
development in Doha, Qatar, agreed to address the issue of subsidies and the 
fishing industry because “improved disciplines are required to address the 
exceptional and distinctive adverse effects arising from some fisheries sector 
subsidies.”66  In the portion of the declaration dedicated to “trade and 
environment,” the parties observed “that fisheries subsidies form part of the 
negotiations provided for” in the negotiations specifically on WTO Rules.67  This 
effort to reform subsidies in the field of fishing by reforming the WTO Rules has 
been championed by a group that has been labeled the Friends of the Fish and 
opposed by a group that might be named the Friends of Industrial Fishing.  Among 
the Friends of the Fish are Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, 
                                                                                                     
 63. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 25, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
14.  
 64. Id. at art. 4 & 5.  
 65. Id. at art. 4. 
 66. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 67. Id. 
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the Philippines, and the U.S.68  Among the Friends of Industrial Fishing are Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the European Union, which have been reluctant to 
undertake subsidy reforms, claiming that more effort should be put on conservation 
management measures rather than trade measures.69  These parties have argued for 
a ‘bottom-up approach’ allowing for all subsidies except for a few prohibited 
subsidies, such as subsidies to vessels engaged in IUU fishing.  China has accepted 
the need for subsidy reform but has aligned its interests with states requiring 
special and differentiated treatment.70  
The Friends of the Fish proposal is to explicitly provide that certain types of 
fishery subsidies that contribute to overcapacity, overfishing, or other “direct trade- 
distorting effects” should be prohibited with limited exceptions.71  This prohibition 
approach is deemed a “top down” approach that is “a simple, administrable, [sic] 
enforceable and realistic structure for strengthened disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies, with sufficient flexibility to address the realities of the fisheries sector 
and the legitimate interests of Members.”72  Although most “perverse subsidies” 
would be considered “red box” prohibited subsidies, there would also be the 
possibility of “dark amber” subsidies that would be presumed harmful unless the 
member could show “that the subsidy was not being used to fish in a fishery that is 
overfished, or that effective restrictions were placed on the operation of the 
programme so that it does not result in overcapacity or overfishing.”73  Some states 
have proposed specific categories of subsidies that should be prohibited.  For 
example, Chile has proposed banning subsidies that: permit the transfer of existing 
ships into either high seas operations or third-country operations; contribute to the 
purchase of new or used ships; modernize existing fleets; reduce production costs 
of fishing; provide favorable discriminatory tax treatment for the capture, 
processing, or marketing of fish products; or result in additional access to credit.74 
In 2005, the parties at the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting indicated “that there 
is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the 
fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries 
subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing . . . .”75  In 2007, the 
Committee on Rules provided a draft negotiating text to WTO members to advance 
discussions.76  The text provided a section on specific prohibitions on subsidies, 
                                                                                                     
 68. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, The Doha Mandate to Address Fisheries Subsidies:  Issues, 
TN/RL/W/3 (Apr. 23, 2002). 
 69. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Japan’s Basic Position on the Fisheries Subsidies Issue, ¶ 
20, TN/RL/W/11 (July 1, 2002). 
 70. See, e.g., WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/241/Rev.1 (Oct. 
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 71. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Possible Approaches to Improved Disciplines on Fisheries 
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 73. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, supra note 69, at ¶ 6. 
 74. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Possible Approaches to Improve Disciplines on Fisheries 
Subsidies, ¶ 8, TN/RL/W/115 (June 10, 2003). 
 75. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 22 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC.  
 76. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM 
Agreements, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007). 
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exceptions to the prohibitions, such as fishing safety, and special treatment for 
developing countries in relation to some of the prohibited subsidies, and a general 
discipline on subsidies.77  Key actors from the Friends of the Fish expressed 
enthusiasm about this proposal because it reflects the “top down” approach of 
prohibiting most subsidies with limited exceptions.78  
For almost five years, the stalemate between the Friends of the Fish and the 
Friends of the Fishing Industry over approving the draft has continued with certain 
large industry players such as China using the negotiations as an opportunity to 
advance concerns about special and differentiated treatment of developing 
countries.  In 2010, China stated in a shared communication with India, Mexico 
and Brazil that:  
Our assumption here is that the prohibition of subsidies causing excessive fishing 
effort and negatively impacting fisheries resources can and shall be reconciled 
with the important role of fisheries subsidies in the economic development of 
developing countries.  The applicable controls should allow developing countries 
to achieve development priorities, poverty reduction, and address their livelihood 
and food security concerns.79 
Brazil, China, and Mexico, joined by Ecuador and Venezuela, had earlier 
asserted that developing countries must not be prevented from providing 
operational and capital support for high seas activities by their fleets.80  China’s 
participation in both of these communications must be regarded with some 
disingenuousness in light of China’s subsidized overexploitation of West African 
waters and the high seas.81  China may be using the negotiations as an opportunity 
to avoid drawing additional attention to its subsidy practices.  Japan’s resistance to 
the WTO negotiations has drawn substantial attention from NGOs and the media.  
The Republic of South Korea is skeptical of the multilateral efforts to prohibit 
certain types of subsidies and suggests that attention should instead be shifted to 
“means of identifying maximum sustainable yield (MSY), vessel registration, 
allowable catch quotas, effective enforcement, monitoring and surveillance, and 
effective penalties for violation.”82  While these actions may also be necessary to 
address serious issues of unregulated fishing, they also serve as distractions in the 
context of the multilateral trade negotiations.  Korea takes a position that only a 
narrow category of subsidies should be prohibited, such as subsidies to vessels 
engaged in illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing, allowing for the transfer of 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at arts I-IV.  
 78. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Fisheries Subsidies, ¶ 6, TN/RL/W/235 (July 18, 2008) 
(stating “[t]he Chair’s draft text of a new fisheries subsidies agreement represents a substantial advance 
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TN/RL/GEN/163 (Feb. 8, 2010).  
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 82. WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Framework of the Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies, ¶ 23, 
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fishing vessels to third countries, transferring access rights, and enhancing fishing 
capacity of vessels.83  Accepting that fuel subsidies have the potential to lead to 
excess fishing effort, Korea is particularly reluctant to support any removal of fuel 
subsidies because the “categorical prohibition of fuel subsidy in its entirety, simple 
as it may be, would cause substantially negative impact [sic] on the livelihood of 
the Members’ fishing households that have been traditionally dependent upon such 
measures.”84 
The newly appointed (and frustrated) Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, 
career diplomat Ambassador Dennis Francis from Trinidad and Tobago, observed 
in 2011 that parties 
appear[ed] to be focusing principally on maintaining their own status quo by 
placing on “others” the main responsibility to implement solutions, while 
minimizing the impact of disciplines on their own activities.  Thus in spite of the 
nearly universal calls for disciplining subsidies in an effective way, many 
delegations in practice seem to elevate the exceptions above the disciplines.  For 
some developed Members, a main reason given is that subsidies are necessary to 
protect traditional ways of life, vulnerable coastal communities, and jobs in the 
fisheries sector.  For many developing Members, a main reason often cited is the 
need for policy space to subsidize in order to harness fisheries as a basis for 
development, economic growth, and employment. In the face of the sharp and 
continuing declines in the fisheries resources, however, it is hard to see how such 
strategies can either protect communities and jobs or be a source of food security 
and stable growth over the long-term.85 
The Chairman remained optimistic that a compromise could be reached, 
though he urged the negotiators to focus on the realities of collapsing stocks and 
the damage to the fishing industry as a result, “and less on protecting their short-
term defensive interests.”86  But, as of 2012 after the latest Ministerial Conference 
in Bali, there has been no progress on advancing a text that will prohibit certain 
perverse fishing subsidies.  Meanwhile, certain entities such as the European 
Commission (EC) have renewed their subsidies for their fleets while continuing to 
set quotas that exceed scientific advice.87  In 2011, the EC observed that 63% of 
Europe Atlantic waters were overfished, as were 82% of the Mediterranean 
waters.88  In Fall 2012, however, European fishing ministers agreed to maintain 
fishing subsidies, including subsidies to modernize fleets.89  Until negotiating 
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 86. Id. at 49.  
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parties can focus on the overcapacity of fishing fleets as a problem requiring a 
long-term commitment, a multilateral solution will remain in the realm of magical 
thinking.  The final section proposes unilateral efforts or a limited ten or twelve 
country multilateral effort from the Friends of Fish to design trade measures to 
protect fishery resources from perverse subsidies.  
III.  UTILIZING UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES  
TO TACKLE PERVERSE SUBSIDIES 
Trade plays an especially important role in global marine capture fisheries 
since 37% of harvested fish is traded internationally and provides foreign currency 
to a number of developing states.90  Among the larger importing states and entities 
are Japan, the European Union, and the U.S. Imports valued at $13.1 billion, which 
accounted for 84% of the seafood eaten in the U.S. with imports from China, 
Thailand, Canada, Indonesia, Vietnam, Ecuador, and Chile.91  Ordinarily, 
undertaking unilateral trade measures for conservation is strongly discouraged 
because international trade depends on an absence of barriers.  Yet, multilateral 
solutions have become mired in endless loops of debates punctuated by proposals 
from the Friends of the Fish that remain unfulfilled and largely aspirational.  If 
cooperative multilateralism will not be part of the solution here, then 
multilateralism should not prove to be a barrier for states that seek to end certain 
perverse fishing subsidies.  As long as states eliminate these perverse subsidies for 
their own fishing fleets, they can require the same from other states.  
Perverse fishing subsidies require action now.  Even while the WTO 
negotiators become stymied by the discussion of agricultural subsidies, the fish 
subsidy issue should be decoupled.  As Christopher Stone wrote fifteen years ago 
remarking on the overcapacity of fishing fleets, “[t]here are many arguments 
against farm subsidies, but long-term impairment, and the collapse of productivity 
are not usually among them.”92  Since Professor Stone wrote his article suggesting 
a test case for fisheries subsidies under the Subsidy and Countervailing Measure 
Agreement,93 the extent of overexploitation of stocks has increased.  In the 1998 
FAO State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture report, an estimated 44% of fish 
stocks were fully exploited, 6% were depleted, and 16% were overexploited.94  In 
the 2012 report, 57.4% of fish stocks were fully exploited, and almost 29.9% were 
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overexploited (a category now containing depleted and recovering fish).95   
The interpretation of Article XX of the GATT suggests that certain types of 
unilateral trade exceptions such as prohibiting the import of fishing products reliant 
on perverse subsidies may be legal within the GATT framework.  Article XX 
provides that nothing in the GATT “shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . (g) relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .”96  
This section is conditioned on the Article XX chapeau requiring that the measures 
not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries” or as “a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”97  Here, a unilateral elimination of perverse subsidies, such as 
those identified by the Friends of the Fish, would clearly relate to the “conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources” as long as domestic producers of the fish were not 
the recipient of trade-distorting subsidies.  Certain types of subsidies, such as fuel 
tax exemption, interfere with competing conservation measures since multinational 
ships are able to continue to engage in distant water fishing that would otherwise be 
unprofitable.  But for the subsidies, the fishery resources may remain in situ 
because of a reduced incentive to engage in expensive industrial harvesting trips.  
Keeping resources in situ is an effective conservation measure.  This would be 
especially true for high seas bottom trawlers, where recent estimates of fuel 
subsidies are approximately $78 million per year.  This is about 25% of their total 
landed value in an industry where profits are less than 10% of the landed value. 98   
Given analysis by the Appellate Body in its most recent decision on the 
application of Article XX(g) to the U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle dispute,99 a unilateral trade 
measure prohibiting products suspected of being financed through perverse 
subsidies would survive a challenge.  This Shrimp/Turtle decision presents the 
most recent thinking of the WTO Dispute Settlement system on the application of 
Article XX(g) to conservation measures; the same exception that might be invoked 
in the case of a challenge to measures prohibiting subsidized fishery product.   
The Shrimp/Turtle case is particularly instructive because of the approach 
taken by the Appellate Body in applying both the exception language in Article 
XX(g) and the chapeau.  Involving a trade restriction on shrimp products from 
countries that did not have turtle conservation programs equivalent to the United 
States, the appellate body confirmed the possibility that unilateral measures based 
on “conservation measures” would be legal.  Sea turtles were considered 
                                                                                                     
 95. FAO FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE DEPT., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF WORLD 
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“exhaustible natural resources”100 and the fishing restriction program under U.S. 
public law101 was a conservation measure that was “not disproportionately wide in 
its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation 
of sea turtle species.”102  The means provided in the measure were “reasonably 
related to the ends.”103   
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of Article XX(g) poses no difficulty for a 
measure prohibiting imports of products subsidized by “perverse subsidies” 
encouraging overcapacity and excess fishing effort.  Fish have already been found 
to be an “exhaustible natural resource.”104  Any measure that prohibits the subsidy 
for both foreign fishing fleets and domestic fishing fleets would likewise be 
considered to be reasonably related to the ends of restoring threatened global 
fisheries.  
In its analysis of the chapeau, the Appellate Body makes a number of 
important observations about the manner in which a specific conservation measure 
is applied.  As long as the conservation measure does not result in an “abuse or 
misuse” of the GATT treaty,105 then parties can exercise a trade-restrictive measure 
as long as it does not result in “arbitrary or unjustifiable” discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade.  The Appellate Body found that the conservation 
measure in question imposed “a single, rigid and unbending requirement that 
countries . . . adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is essentially the same 
as the United States’ program without inquiring into the appropriateness of that 
program for the conditions prevailing in the exporting countries.”106  In response, 
the U.S. amended its measure to require programs that did not have to be the same 
as the U.S. program but needed to be “comparable in effectiveness.”  When the 
U.S. was challenged on this revised measure, the WTO Appellate Body concluded 
that “conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme comparable in 
effectiveness, allows for sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so as 
to avoid ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.’”107 
This interpretation also poses no problems for a prohibition on perverse 
subsidies.  Here, a state undertaking a unilateral conservation measure might be 
able to draft a measure that would not specifically eliminate specific types of 
subsidies, but would instead start with a presumption of prohibiting subsidized 
products unless states trading fish products can demonstrate conservation measures 
that offset the provision of perverse subsidies (e.g., effective restoration subsidies 
equal to subsidies provided for extraction).  This provision would provide the same 
flexibility as the amended U.S. provision by relying on efforts that might be 
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“comparable in effectiveness” in terms of conserving fish stocks without ruling out 
the possibility of other effective approaches to protecting stocks from overfishing, 
such as the implementation of a Marine Protected Area to restore fish stocks in 
overexploited habitats.  
One final aspect of the Appellate Body decision is unlikely to interfere with a 
proposal for unilateral anti-subsidy measures.  The Appellate Body observed that 
the U.S. on the matter of sea turtle protection had failed to engage “in serious, 
across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or 
multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before 
enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other 
Members.”108  While the U.S. had concluded a treaty in Latin America on the 
conservation of sea turtles,109 no similar efforts were made in Asia.  Because it 
seemed that “the United States negotiated seriously with some, but not with other 
Members [of the WTO],”110 the U.S. measures were discriminatory.  Here, the 
Friends of the Fish who might be willing to politically pursue a unilateral import 
prohibition have already engaged in serious multilateral negotiations with no 
compromise being reached with the Friends of Industrial Fishing.  There are ample 
documented good faith efforts of WTO members attempting to reach a multilateral 
solution to the problem of oversubsidized fleets depleting fishery resources.  
Imposing unilateral conservation measures in the form of trade restrictions when 
other WTO members appear unwilling to negotiate in good faith is a reasonable 
end protected by Article XX.   
Because it can be lonely in the lead, there is no reason that any single country 
from the Friends of the Fish need take the lead in imposing unilateral measures.  
Rather, it may be possible for all of the Friends of the Fish to negotiate a 
multilateral treaty among themselves based on their existing interpretations of the 
WTO subsidy rules and invite the remainder of the WTO countries to join the 
treaty.  The basis of the treaty could be two fold.  First, it could be an important 
international environmental treaty providing subsidy reductions as a conservation 
measure.  Second, it could be a preferential international trade treaty to highlight 
that countries that insist on continuing to provide subsidies are undercutting the 
ability of other states to competitively sell their fish.  After all, fishing fleets whose 
capital costs are largely covered by their governments are in a better financial 
position to sell their fish products at prices below market value.  The 
implementation of a multilateral treaty embodying the current proposals of the 
Friends of the Fish would survive a GATT Article XX(g) challenge for the same 
reasons that a unilateral measure by a single country would survive.  
While much has been written about the relationship between trade and the 
environment, little has been done to use trade mechanisms to ensure conservation 
of commercial fisheries.  Given the importance of fish products for international 
trade, the chronic inability to restrict trade to reflect the biological constraints of 
rebuilding stocks has had devastating impacts on fishery resources.  The collapse of 
fisheries today is a multi-pronged problem with no single panacea.  Devising trade 
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rules, however, that consider the environmental limitations of trading in certain 
resources is essential.  CITES has failed to curb the extensive trade in 
overexploited species such as tuna.  FAO initiatives have failed to change the 
behavior of states in financially underwriting destructive fishing practices, and the 
WTO, the venue most likely to be able to rewrite trade rules, is stalled.  In contrast 
to a full WTO revision, unilateral conservation measures or limited multilateral 
responses are viable options. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Unilateralism can be a powerful tool of persuasion in improving 
implementation of conservation measures.  In 1995, Canada unilaterally 
implemented legislation permitting it to board and arrest foreign vessels on the high 
seas that were fishing in breach of Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO) conservation and management measures.111  When Canada seized the 
Estai, Spain accused Canada of high seas piracy.  Eventually, Spain and Canada 
agreed to improve fishery control and enforcement within the NAFO area and to 
negotiate voluntary quotas for the straddling stocks.112  Thus, Canada’s unilateral 
action provoked a needed response.  Today, both countries maintain, “[i]n the 
sector of fisheries management and conservation . . . a constructive cooperation 
based on dialogue and cooperation . . . to ensure that fishing resources are exploited 
in a sustainable and responsible manner.”113  
As one of the Friends of the Fish, Canada could take a strong position on 
sourcing its fish in line with the stand it took in arresting the Estai under its 
domestic laws.  The U.S. already has legislation through the Pelly Amendment 
prohibiting the import of fish products from foreign countries whose vessels 
conduct “fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the 
effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.”114  Depending on 
whether the voluntary International Program of Action on Fishing Capacity can be 
construed as an international fishery conservation program within the meaning of 
the Pelly Amendment, the U.S. may already be in a position to domestically 
prohibit the importation of products underwritten by perverse subsidies.  It would 
be an admirable step for the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with the 
U.S. Trade Representative, to request that the President implement the fishery 
subsidy recommendation that the U.S. has been offering during the Doha Round 
through the Pelly Amendment.  
Unilateralism serves a role when multilateralism falters.  It offers opportunities 
for states to end protracted negotiations and act in a manner that will further needed 
conservation goals.  The fishing subsidy debates must not become entrapped in the 
circular debates that have monopolized multilateral climate change negotiations.  
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The GATT offers the necessary exceptions for states to act and to ensure that states 
will not face empty nets in the near future because of their inability to act 
decisively now.  
  
